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Green Revolution technologies were developed and promoted to boost food supplies 
and foster development, both of which were expected to create "breathing space" for 
achieving demographic transitions in developing countries through lowered human fertility.  
Little comprehensive research, however, has been done on the effects of those technologies 
themselves on human fertility -- leaving unanswered the question of whether particular types 
of agricultural technologies were actually increasing, or decreasing, this demographic 
"breathing space."  This paper uses District-level data from rural India on agricultural change 
(from 1961 to 1981) and changes in human fertility (from 1971 to 1981) to assess the impact 
of the former on the latter, with particular emphasis on high yielding (HYV) Green 
Revolution technologies.  Modifying a conceptual framework derived from theory on the 
determinants of fertility, and estimating a reduced form model that explicitly accounts for 
endogeneity of real wage growth, we find that, while socio-cultural and demographic factors 
were the strongest determinants of fertility change:  a) Green Revolution and related 
technologies did have an impact on fertility change; b) that the magnitude and direction of 
this impact was technology specific; and c) that the impact was only partially due to the 
effect of the new technologies on changes in real wage growth. 
 
Rapid real wage growth was significantly associated with more rapid subsequent 
fertility decline.  Even controlling for real wage growth effects explained by HYV 
technologies, HYV-technology-specific impacts on human fertility declines persisted:   
greater diffusion of both wheat and rice HYV led to faster fertility declines, while greater 
diffusion of bajra HYV led to smaller fertility declines.  The study confirms the 
overwhelming importance of socio-cultural and demographic variables such as female 
literacy and marriage rates in determining fertility change, and finds a fertility-promoting 
role of high initial (1961) levels (not growth) of per capita cereal calorie production -- 
perhaps an indication of the low nutritional levels prevalent at that time in the sample.  
Policy implications are drawn, including the need to continue to develop sustainable 
agricultural technologies appropriate to developing areas, but with more attention paid to 
their human fertility consequences, so that compensating policies can be implemented, if 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
AGRICULTURAL TECHNICAL CHANGE AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION:  
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
                                                           
*  Research Fellow, Environment and Production Technology Division, International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Washington, DC. 
**  Research Analyst, Environment and Production Technology Division, International Food Policy 
Research Institute, Washington, DC. 
***  School of African and Asian Studies, University of Sussex, England. 
No direct and comprehensive studies of the impact on human fertility of overall, 
substantial technical change in agriculture as yet exist.  Since the classic analysis by the 
Ford Foundation (1959) of "India’s food crisis and steps to meet it," however, the 
mission, mandate, and underlying assumptions of the International Agricultural Research 
Centers (IARCs) in developing countries have been rooted in a particular view of the 
nexus between population growth and agro-technical change.  This Ford-IARC view 
accepted Malthus’s belief that population growth eventually reaches a point of land 




expansion of land area, except with prohibitively sharp rises in the marginal cost of 
bringing land into cultivation.  The Ford Foundation’s 1959 document argued that this 
point would be reached in India in the early 1960s, but that technical change in 
agriculture could be developed and promoted to avoid (not just postpone) Malthusian 
outcomes.  This more recent view has been dubbed "Malthusian optimism" by Sen 
(1981). 
This paper seeks to test one key underlying assumption associated with the belief 
that, through yield-enhancing progress in the production of food staples, which can 
substantially and sustainably reduce hunger and poverty, a "breathing space" wherein a 
society will reduce its human fertility will be created.  This assumption is that such 
progress does not itself increase human fertility.  In particular, we examine the 
relationship between the spread of seed-fertilizer-water-control (hereafter called "HYV-
linked") technologies, and subsequent changes in human fertility, across a sample of 
Districts in rural India. 
Early Malthus
1 and the Ford-IARC view diverge sharply on whether higher yields 
of food staples would help at the point of land exhaustion.  Malthus argued that (1) the 
scope for rapid yield-enhancing responses of food production to population growth was 
usually small and readily exhausted; more fundamentally, (2) extra food and income 
would increase fertility and hence population growth, so that the gain in the level of 
living would be wiped out; indeed, (3) further population growth was liable to meet 
                                                           
1  Malthus (1798).  Later editions, and above all Malthus (1824/1830), recognized that "extreme 
healthiness" could induce lower, not higher, fertility (and was itself linked to improved income and 




"positive checks," especially from famines.  In contrast, the Ford-IARC neo-Malthusian 
view was that (1) HYV-linked advances in food yields could bring about big, sustainable 
rises in the rate of growth of food supply; more fundamentally, (2) there would be no 
"positive checks" because in the long run the HYVs would help to reduce human fertility 
in a "demographic transition."  The neo-Malthusian optimists accepted that poor people, 
as they enjoyed better income and nutrition, would at first not only lower their mortality 
but, as Malthus had feared, raise their fertility.  However, the neo-Malthusian view is 
that, in the 10- to 20-year time-horizon, the poor would respond to better life chances (for 
themselves and their children) by lowering fertility by more than enough to offset 
reduced mortality.
2  HYVs, in other words, would fit into a context of "demographic 
transition" and voluntary fertility reduction, both by delayed marriage (of which Malthus 
approved) and by contraception (which he rejected as vicious). 
Thus, on the Ford-IARC model, the HYV-centered transformation of food 
production would solve the problem of poverty and undernutrition: 
•  in the short run, by raising yields (despite the virtual ending of land expansion) 
more and faster than Malthus had deemed feasible and thereby reducing mass 
poverty; 
•  in the long run, by providing "breathing space" during which the reduction of 
mass poverty -- partly due to the HYVs themselves -- would lastingly reduce 
fertility, natural increase, and hence pressure on food supplies. 
                                                           
2  It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the role of high-yielding varieties and associated 
technologies in mortality reduction, or the subsequent impact of lower child and infant mortality on fertility. 




Both links in this chain of reasoning have been questioned.  First, although food 
output and average income have grown fastest where HYV-linked technologies have 
advanced furthest (Lipton, 1989), such growth may have initially -- within the first few 
years until HYV adoption had diffused -- reached mainly the better off, slightly delaying 
the benefit to many of the poor and undernourished.  And, while evidence from one 
Indian District suggests that, after diffusion had run its course, the poor had 
proportionally better income gains than other wealth groups (Hazell and Ramasamy, 
1991), there may be circumstances under which the poor did not gain relatively more in 
terms of income.  As it is the poor and undernourished whose initial fertility (and 
mortality) was highest, and whose well-being food constrained, these relative differences 
in income growth, and even a short time lag for benefits may make a difference for 
demographic transition.  If the poor could not obtain more food and income from (or at 
least after) HYVs, the Ford-IARC model would not have had a chance to work, let alone 
to achieve the "breathing space."
3  Second, even if poor people (with high initial 
fertility and mortality) obtain sharply improved income and nutrition, modern theory and 
evidence suggest that such improvements may not affect fertility directly at all, instead 
operating through intervening variables to alter the incentives to have children.  If so, the 
way in which gains in income and nutrition are realized would affect the timing, extent, 
and perhaps even direction of subsequent changes in fertility.  Different mechanisms, 
                                                           
3  There is a life-cycle issue here.  For the model to work, not only must those with currently high fertility 
and mortality benefit from HYVs, they must also do so early enough in their life-spans, and respond swiftly 
enough, for their fertility decisions to be affected (reduced) by the income and health gains from HYVs.  
There is much research on the effect of yield-enhancing agricultural progress on poverty and income 




technologies, etc., for achieving income and nutrition gains could affect these intervening 
variables differently.  These intervening variables fall into three main categories:  
demand, supply, and socio-cultural. 
Demand by couples
4 for children is affected by human, emotional, and biological 
needs -- but also by parents’ expectations about the economic costs of bearing and rearing 
offspring and about their subsequent income benefits from offspring’s income.  Costs are 
affected both by the direct expenditure on the child’s food and by the foregone 
opportunities of mothers to work and earn if they are free of child care.  Income benefits 
are affected by the expected earnings of "few but educated" children vis-ą-vis those of 
"many but unskilled" children -- that is, by the strength of the case for parents to 
"substitute quality for quantity" in setting family size norms.
5  These cost-income 
determinants of couples’ demand for children, which include the full cost of averting 
births via contraception, comprise the Chicago-Columbia factor (Becker and Lewis, 
1974; Schultz, 1981).  This suggests that HYV technologies, in areas more affected by 
them, will (a) reduce fertility because -- since HYVs increase income, living standards, 
and the skill content of work -- the costs of child-rearing increase, as do the prospects for 
the educated, later-marrying children (and educated women); but (b) offsetting this, 
increase fertility to the extent that HYV technologies raise the demand for unskilled and 
                                                           
4  This argument implies that the couple is the decision-making unit, either by agreement or by (usually 
male) dictatorship.  Alternatively, theories of intrahousehold bargaining posit that partners may have 
opposing (or imperfectly congruent) ideal outcomes vis-ą-vis fertility decisions, and adversarial (or partially 
cooperative) strategies to reach household decisions.  Such theories may imply different fertility outcomes 
from the "couples’ demand" model (see, e.g., Rao and Greene, 1991). 
5  Note that this case depends on the couple’s trade-off between present and future income streams -- and 




young labor; and (c) ambiguously affect fertility as HYV technology raises the demand 
for women’s work -- discouraging frequent pregnancies, but raising the "long-sighted" 
demand for girl children.  In Indian conditions, we hypothesize that effect (a) will 
predominate (because (b) is diffused over a long period, and (c) works both ways). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
children and workers earn less than "educated" ones in the long run; but at age 10-18 they earn more, and 




Couples’ supply of children is affected by biological fertility, which initially 
increases as nutrition improves among very poor people, partly for biomedical reasons 
emphasized by Easterlin (1980).  These supply influences comprise the "Pennsylvania 
factor."  For the very poor, more and better food brings earlier menarche, later 
menopause, and a lower risk of miscarriage or stillbirth.  The extreme version of such 
effects is that, if caloric intake is below some critical level, reproductive capacity shuts 
down.  Above that level, but below a still very low caloric intake -- called the nutritional 
biomedical "sufficiency" level with regard to reproduction -- additional calories normally 
increase fertility, perhaps at first with increasing reproductive returns,
6 but over most of 
the range with a diminishing marginal increment.  The  Pennsylvania factor would induce 
higher fertility in areas more affected by HYV-linked technologies, but only as long as 
income (and other circumstances) induce caloric intakes between the critical level and the 
sufficiency level.  Hence,  we hypothesize that -- among the poorer Indian Districts only, 
that is, those below the sufficiency level -- the spread of HYV-linked technology would 
prompt short run fertility increases. 
                                                           
6  In other words, between the critical calorie cut-off, and the sufficient calorie cut-off, exists a "biological 
fertility curve," with portions at least shaped like a standard production function for a given input  (first 
increasing, then decreasing  returns, but always positive, over the relevant range). 
The "Easterlin synthesis" combines the biological and socioeconomic 
determinants of human fertility, and is largely supported by the findings of the World 




factor" constitutes an important modification to this synthesis (Cain and McNicoll, 1986). 
 For example, Cain (1981) argues that, in the absence of effective institutions to smooth 
consumption in the face of risk, children have an insurance value that can significantly 
increase fertility.  More broadly, socio-cultural factors -- the religion, family and 
inheritance pattern, kin structure, caste and class norms regarding marriage and literacy, 
etc. -- surrounding a couple will affect its "demand for children," by altering the 
incidence of costs and incomes from them (which is caught in the Easterlin synthesis), 
but also -- less measurably -- by influencing "family size norms" (and attitudes towards 
various contraceptive methods) at any given set of costs, prices, and income streams. 
In summary, modern demographic theory (Figure 1, Part A) predicts that anything 
that changes household food availability, opportunity costs, or income prospects will 
affect fertility largely via couples’ (i) demand for children, and (ii) biological supply of 
children, both mediated by (iii) socio-cultural factors.  Excluding emotional and moral 
impacts on parents of children, childlessness, or contraception, then, modern theory 
predicts as follows.  From factor (i) -- parents’ economic demand for children -- fertility 
will increase:  with rises in the discounted present value of children’s expected transfers 
(to parents) of their future incomes as surviving workers (as children, adolescents, or 
adults); with rises in the returns to unskilled vis-a-vis educated labor; with falls in the 
discounted present value of childbearing and rearing, including opportunity cost of, 
access to, and use of contraception.  From factor (ii) -- biological supply of children -- 
fertility will increase as potential mothers’ caloric intake (relative to requirements) 




cause of such increases for the very poor, is mediated largely by maternal health, 
nutrition, and hygiene.  In empirical studies, factors (i) and (ii) typically account for 30-
40% of inter-household variance in fertility indicators.  The remaining 60-70% of the 
variance among households is presumably explained by factor (iii):  socio-cultural 
(including individual psychological and emotional) factors affecting attitudes toward 




HYV TECHNOLOGIES:  POTENTIAL AVENUES FOR FERTILITY IMPACT 
 
HYV-linked technologies -- as they change income, income sources, real wages, 
labor demand patterns, and food availability, can well affect factors (i) through (iii), and 
consequently alter human fertility.  As for factor (i), HYVs can raise overall household 
income, and also increase real wages to working children and adolescents (and to labor 
overall).  This at first raises incentives to fertility, but also -- by raising opportunity-cost 
of child care for potentially working women, and, more directly, by increasing the skill 
levels of production -- leads parents to prefer fewer but better-educated children, on or 
off the farm (Becker and Lewis, 1974).
7  Still with factor (i), but on the cost side, HYV-
based rises in agriculturists’ family income, by reducing child mortality, should lower the 
expected (average) cost of producing a child that survives to adulthood.  
                                                           
7  HYVs can also influence wage rates and demand for labor indirectly.  The elasticity of the employment 
per hectare, with respect to growth in yields due to HYV-linked technology, had fallen from about 0.4 in 
the early 1970s to about 0.1 in the mid-1980s, for both rice (Jayasuriya and Shand, 1986) and for wheat 
(Bhalla, 1987).  This is because the manner in which HYVs have spread (not their direct economics) has, 
via mechanization, tended to reduce the extent to which HYV-linked technology raises the demand for 
adolescent labor, and to increase the demand for skilled relative to unskilled labor.  Both trends are fertility 




As for factor (ii), insofar as HYVs provide extra food to those whose fertility 
behavior had been food-constrained, they initially remove biological, health-nutrition 
constraints upon the number of live births, raising the "supply curve" of children and thus 
total fertility.  However, health-nutrition improvements can also lower the "demand 
curve" for children.  As parents come to rely on being able to produce (relative to the 
number of conceptions) more -- and healthier -- children who survive to adulthood, 
couples may choose voluntarily to restrict conceptions, therefore lowering total fertility.
8 
Factor (iii) may also be affected.  HYVs are likely to be associated with a 
transition to market-mediated, impersonal transactions, and that transition tends to be 
accompanied by changes in family and social structure.  These changes, in turn, may well 
affect fertility decisions, generally by reducing family size norms. 
These complex effects are far from the earlier, automatic assumptions that HYVs 
would necessarily accompany, and probably accelerate, transition to lower fertility rates. 
 They suggest that HYVs could exert an initial upward effect on fertility (through a 
hypothesized rise in demand for labor), especially in extremely poor areas, where 
undernutrition may have constrained fertility previously.  The initial upward effect would 
be followed by a fertility decline, as reductions in child mortality, rising demand for 
parental (and for skilled relative to unskilled) labor, and rising "living standards" and 
                                                           
8  Medically, this is a virtuous circle, because high-order siblings run sharply increased risks of child 




therefore child-rearing costs, together altered couples’ assessment of the net economic 
advantages of extra children. 
Still, because of the manner in which HYV-linked technologies were 
implemented, "priors" regarding particularly the timing and extent, but also the direction 
and level, of an HYV-linked effect on fertility under specific conditions are highly 
speculative.  Particular technologies were phased in at different times and to varying 
extents in different geographical areas; they therefore, taken separately or together, had 
different effects on local labor demand, income, and food availability.  To isolate such 
effects requires controlling for the agricultural, and socio-cultural and demographic 
situations of rural households at the onset of HYV-linked technological change, and also 
for concurrent agricultural change not explicitly linked to HYV technologies (such as 
mechanization, area expansion, changes in crop mix, etc.). 
In the absence of comprehensive studies of this kind, we can look to a small 
number of studies of how rural projects, for example, in irrigation or electrification, 
affect fertility (Stoeckel and Jain, 1986; Oberai, 1992, especially pages 98-131; and to 
some extent Schutjer and Stokes, 1984) for some hints on what to expect.  The results of 
these studies tend to be in line with the "Easterlin synthesis," and our expectations.  
Where fertility is measured shortly after a project begins to operate -- within 2-3 years of 
start-up -- there is a short-run increase in live birth-rates, perhaps because higher incomes 
bring improved maternal nutrition and thus a lower proportion of miscarriages and 
stillbirths, and/or because couples see better earnings prospects for children.  However, if 




below pre-project levels, for two reasons.  First, higher family incomes -- and better 
prospects for children to find more skilled work as the project area develops -- lead 
couples to spend on fewer but better-educated children.  Second, in some cases, project-
based development improves mothers’ employment prospects (and perhaps even returns 
to their further training or education), raising the opportunity cost of their time, which 
again reduces desired fertility.  A village-level pilot study (Basu, Raghu, and Nikhil, 
1979) lends some support to the Cain-McNicoll hypothesis that community-level factors 
intervene between these individual preferences and fertility behaviors, thus modifying the 
"Easterlin" outcomes. 
Although the signs of the variables linking project impact to fertility are plausible 
given the leading hypotheses of modern economic demography, the indicators of the 
sizes of the effects (betas, R
2s, sometimes t-statistics, etc.) are, on the whole, 
unconvincing and small, for three reasons.  (a) First, a single project, even a substantial 
irrigation or electrification investment, often provides only a small "prod" to household 
incentives affecting fertility, as compared with other changing influences on fertility via 
new options for production, employment, or education-health-nutrition. (b) Second, such 
project impact is normally in a rather small area, whereas choices affecting fertility 
(including migration) take place over a wider area. (c) Third, most studies of fertility 
effect are carried out within five years of project construction and start-up; even that is 
probably too little time to isolate many fertility effects (because of time-lags in 
responses), or to observe them (because vital events per year are generally few, even 




FILLING RESEARCH GAPS:  A DISTRICT-LEVEL MODEL 
This study meets points (a)-(c) by looking at:  (a) the fertility effects of not a 
project, but a great agricultural transformation, viz., the seed-water-fertilizer changes 
associated -- to very different extents in different parts of India -- with the "green 
revolution"; (b) differences in impact on fertility, not within a small project area, but 
among well over one hundred Indian rural Districts, typically large areas of 2-3 million 
people;
9 and (c) a ten-year period of fertility change, 1971-81, covering responses to a 
fifteen-year period of (regionally specific) agricultural transformation, 1965-80, and a 
prior four-year base period of agricultural activities, 1960-64.  A District-level approach 
has the additional benefit for policy research of coinciding with administrative 
boundaries (that is, to some extent, distinct areas for possible policy responses to the 
research), yet also of having some degree of internal homogeneity.  Further, our data 
reveal that aggregation to a larger administrative level, the State, would "wash out" 
variations from District to District in characteristics critical to the specification of 
agricultural growth patterns and their role in subsequent fertility change. 
                                                           
9  The sample contains 14 of 23 Districts in Andhra Pradesh, 16 of 18 Districts in Gujarat, 1 of 8 Districts in 
Haryana, all 43 Districts in Madhya Pradesh, 25 of 26 Districts in Maharashtra, all 19 Districts in 
Karnataka, 4 of 12 Districts in the Punjab, and 9 of 13 Districts in Tamil Nadu.  The representativeness of 
the sample is discussed, and the descriptive statistics for variables included in the study presented, in a later 
section.  A list of included Districts is available from the authors. 
As noted above, Part A of Figure 1 depicts an implicitly cross-sectional, 




modified, District-level conceptual model, depicted in Part B of Figure 1 -- that is, the 
analysis takes place not at the level of the household, but at District level, where District 
data are (large) aggregates of household (and farm and other) data.  Note also that, 
instead of focusing on fertility and its determinants, this study’s modified model focuses 
on fertility change and its determinants.  Part B of Figure 1 reflects our view that the 
basic determinants of fertility change will be changes in, and levels of, the basic 
determinants of fertility.  For example, a change in demand for children due to a change 
in income could result in change in fertility behavior -- but that effect may well depend 
upon starting income level, and/or be mediated by socio-cultural factors. 
This District-level approach does have disadvantages:  lost is any ability to 
scrutinize how within-District variation in key variables affects fertility outcomes.  We 
address such concerns as much as possible by incorporating into our model socio-cultural 
and demographic control variables for characteristics thought relevant to fertility 
decisions, which, while measured at District level, reflect within-District differences:  for 
example, changes in prevalence of cultivators,
10 in scheduled tribes within the District 
population, and in female age-specific literacy rates and marriage rates.
11  Data 
                                                           
10Our measure of cultivators is based on Indian demographic data that classify households according to 
whether labor or farm operations is the main income source.  Krishnaji (1989) goes into the difficulties of 
pinpointing prevalence of landlessness using these data, and notes the lack of fertility statistics specific to 
each labor category.  He suggests that the size and structure of landless households indicate that their 
patterns of mortality, and perhaps fertility, differ from those of cultivators. 
11  Migration, especially of rural females, both within and across Districts, could in principle be significant 
for fertility rates.  However, an examination of migration patterns for 1981, and of the State of Karnataka in 
particular, revealed that most rural female migration (77%, in Karnataka’s case) occurs within Districts, and 
most of the remainder (a further 16%, in Karnataka’s case) occurs within States.  Thus the fact that this 
study does not control for inter-State migration is not seen to be a serious flaw (Lipton and Vosti, 1991).  




unavailability makes within-District variation in the agricultural and technical change 
characteristics (both those measured, and those not, for example, farm size) under study 
impossible to gauge. 
Using the District-level model in Figure 1 Part B, this study empirically estimates 
the impact of levels and changes in critical components of District-level demand for 
children (crop-derived incomes and rural real wages), and one important component of 
the biological supply of children (District-level caloric production from major staples) 
variables on District-level fertility change.  Subsequently, we assess the impact of HYV-
technologies on these demand for and supply of children variables.  Finally, we estimate 
the effects of HYV-technologies on fertility change via these intervening variables, and 
net of them.
12 
                                                                                                                                                                             
male migration patterns) vary significantly and in a way that affects fertility from District to District, this 
study cannot account for them.   
12  Our study variables cannot fully capture the demand for and supply of children as described by theory, 
because (a) no data were available for critical factors such as opportunity cost of time for women, and (b) 
market imperfections -- in real wages and elsewhere -- may mean that the demand for and supply of 
children variables used do not fully reflect changes associated with HYV-related technologies.  We 
therefore expect particular HYV-linked technologies, even controlling for our demand for and supply of 
children variables, to affect fertility change, and test for this. 
To begin with, Section 2 presents evidence on the substantial, but regionally 
variable, decline in human fertility in India, and in our sample Districts, between 1971 
and 1981.  Section 3 briefly reports findings on the speed, nature, and regional variability 
of agricultural change in India, and in our sample Districts, in 1960/61-1980/81, with 




staples.  In both these sections, we review the representativeness of our sample (which 
had to exclude some States, as well as some Districts for States within the sample, for 
want of data).  Section 4 uses multiple regression analysis to trace any evidence for direct 
effects on fertility transition, as predicted by theory, of variables measuring changes 
likely to alter:  factor (i), viz., parents’ expected economic gains and losses from children; 
factor (ii), viz., biological supply of children; or factor (iii), viz., socio-cultural  factors.  
Section 5 tests for the role played by HYV-related technological change and 
mechanization in influencing one major determinant of fertility change -- real wage 
growth.  In addition, Section 5 includes a test for the extent to which HYV-linked 
technologies influenced fertility transition via change in real wages, as opposed to 
through other, non-price paths.  Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of results 




2.  CHANGES IN HUMAN FERTILITY IN INDIA￿1971-1981 
By any measure, aggregate human fertility in India has dropped dramatically 
since the 1970s (Rele, 1987).
13  Figures 2a and 2b depict the frequency distributions of 
declines (in absolute and proportional terms, respectively) in total fertility rate (a 
measure of lifetime female fertility,
14 hereafter called "TFR") for the 131 Districts
15 
making up our sample.
16  Note that, on average, sample Districts saw a 20% decline in 
TFR over the 1971 to 1981 period, but ranging widely, from 1% to 38% (see Figure 2b).   
                                                           
13  State-level evidence suggests that fertility began to decline in India in the middle to late 1960s or early 
1970s (Rele, 1987), but that there was substantial variation across States in the timing and the swiftness of 
these declines (Bhat, et al., 1984).  Owing to the need to rely on 1971 Census data, we began our coverage 
of fertility in India in 1970/71.  While we may have missed some initial total fertility rate (TFR) declines 
because of this truncation, we believe we have captured most of them -- certainly those related to the 
agricultural "green revolution" that occurred between 1965 and 1980. 
14  Average number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to follow the contemporaneous 
fertility pattern throughout her reproductive span (ages 15-49 years), and live to achieve it.  (See Shryock, 
et al., 1976, Ch. 16.) 
15  We began with all Districts with the necessary demographic and agricultural information, approximately 
180 Districts.  Shifts in administrative boundaries over time for some Districts resulted in the 
incompatibility of the fertility series (based on all years, 1961 District boundaries) and the agricultural 
series (1981 boundaries).  Also, the impossibility of "weeding out" effects and determinants of the 
boundary shift itself (and the timing of the shift) for the agricultural and fertility questions under scrutiny 
here, made these Districts unwieldy to study. This reduced the sample to 131 Districts, in Andhra Pradesh, 
Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu only.  (See Table 1 
for the distribution of sample Districts across sample States.)  We estimated the potential selectivity bias 
associated with the restriction of analysis to this generally western Indian sample (Vosti and Lipton, 1991, 
section (V)).  Population change was not linked to shifts in District boundaries, but some forms of 
agricultural change may have been.  In the tables throughout this section of the text, we assess the 
representativeness of the sample for the purposes at hand.  In any event, the study results apply to several 
hundred million individuals in sample Districts, and allow us to explore the extent to and manner in which 
their fertility patterns were affected by agricultural change. 
16  For discussion of the estimation of fertility, see Shryock, et al., 1976.  For details of our estimation of 
District-level TFR, see Vosti and Lipton, 1991.  Specifically: 
 
TFRt = 5 Σ5fas * (5N
o (t)/Σ((5Wa(t) 5fas(t) * 5Lo/los) * 5));  
where 5fas are State-level age-specific fertility rates; 5N
o is the number of children aged 0-5 years in the 
District; (t) is 1971 or 1981; 5Wa is the number of women per child-bearing (5-year) age group in the 
District; and 5Lo/los is State-level child "survivability," thus incorporating child mortality.  Child survival 
rates were computed in turn from 1981 Census data, and, for 1971, extrapolated from State-level estimates 
of age 2 child mortality rates from a 1972 Fertility Survey (Bhat, et al., 1984) (U.N. 1983), giving survival 
probabilities up to age 5 for each State, using the formula: 
 
5Lo/los = 0.2 + 1.3 * p(1) + p(2) + p(3) + p(4) + 0.5 * p(5); where p(1) is the State-level probability of 




 Estimated TFRs of sample Districts were generally in line with the State-level 
estimates of TFRs derived from generally more reliable (Sample Registration Survey) 
data (see Table 1).  Perhaps more importantly for this study focusing on change in 
fertility patterns, the average TFR declines estimated for sample Districts are in line with 
State-level figures (Table 1, columns 10 and 11).
17 
 
3.  AGRICULTURAL CHANGE AT DISTRICT LEVEL IN INDIA ￿ 1960/61-
1980/81 
This section reviews trends in agricultural change for sample Districts, as against 
State and national trends, with special attention paid to HYV-linked technical change and 
other agricultural change that may affect fertility outcomes. 
Virtually every characteristic of agricultural production underwent substantial 
change between 1960/61 and 1980/81, at all-India, sample State, and sample District 
                                                           
17  While, at the all-India level, TFR declined (in absolute terms) substantially less (0.6 children) than it did 
for sample Districts on average (1.1 children), this difference, which could suggest more of a demographic 
transition in the sample than was occurring country wide, could be misleading:  while the all-India figure 
applies to one geographic area, the all-India "aggregation" averages District-level figures, not compensating 
for District-level differences in population or geographic area.  The mode of calculation for District-level 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18  Within our sample, moreover, Districts varied greatly in many agro-technical 
indicators.
19 This section’s Tables report levels of and changes in:  a) land use, b) crop 
mix and yields for major crops, c) labor use, and d) technology use for our sample of 131 
Districts, the States they fall in, and all-India.
20   
Table 2 highlights some land-use indicators of the agricultural intensification 
across India in 1960/61-1980/81.  Gross cropped area (GCA) per rural inhabitant 
declined at annual rates of 1.1% for all-India, and roughly 1.3% for sample Districts and 
sample States.  The ratio of net to gross cropped area declined (indicating intensifying 
land use) at 0.35% per annum for all-India; our sample Districts intensified more 
gradually, at 0.17%.
21  Irrigated area, however, grew at about 2.4% per annum for sample 
Districts, sample States, and all-India. 
Table 3 presents sample District, sample State, and all-India data for crop mix and 
yields for major crops.  Both wheat and rice were less important to, that is,   
                                                           
18  Unless otherwise noted, all point estimates of agricultural change in this section’s Tables are three-year 
averages, centered on the year indicated.  This reduces the impact of short-term climatic shocks.  See Bhalla 
and Tyagi, 1989, for a geographically comprehensive review of agricultural change at District level. 
19  As noted above, this section’s Tables display sample District statistics aggregated over the entire sample 
geographic area. 
20  Where possible, the Tables include data for the sample endpoint years, and also for 1950/1 and 1987/8, 
for sample Districts, sample States, and all-India, to place the sample in geographical and temporal 
perspective.  Representativeness only of relevant characteristics (usually those associated with agricultural 
change) is discussed. 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3--Crop Mix and yield
*:  India, sample states, and sample districts 1950-
1/1970-1 
   
 
       1950-1                  1960-1                      1970-1          
  Sample            Sample  Sample        Sample   Sample        
  States  India Districts  States  India Districts  States  India   
 
GCA  
(million  hectares)  2.8  131.7  72.8  86.9 153.7  76.8  91.6 164.4 
 
Crop Mix 
  Percent rice  14.4  22.5  14.6  15.0  22.2  14.6  15.3  22.8 
  Percent wheat  6.7  7.3  7.4  8.1  8.6  7.9  9.4  11.0 
  Percent jowar  18.3  11.8  20.6  18.5  11.8  18.3  16.6  10.4 
  Percent bajra  5.8  6.8  6.5  6.7  7.3  7.1  7.1  7.6 
  Percent pulses
a  15.4  15.9  8.2  14.3 15.9  8.0  13.0 13.7 
  Percent oilseeds
b  10.1  8.2  9.3  11.8 8.6  9.2  11.7 9.7 
 
 1951-2 
Yield (kilograms per hectare) 
 
  Rice  788.8  707.1  1073.6  1061.5  961.6  1231.4  1359.7  1132.0 
  Wheat  621.8  682.3  653.6  759.9  816.1  984.2  1373.2  1343.3 
  Jowar  386.6  385.0  496.0  426.5  457.1  480.9  465.3  463.4 
  Bajra  291.3  278.2  330.1  334.6  329.2  529.8  634.5  536.8 
  Pulses
a  523.2  602.0  425.7  443.5 495.7  449.0  434.0 512.6 
  Oilseeds
b  504.9  444.6  663.6  510.0 527.0  724.2  626.0 552.2 
   
Sources: Indian Agricultural Statistics, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Department of Agriculture 
and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi.  Various issues. 
Area and Production of Principal Crops in India, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Department of 
Agriculture and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi.  Various issues. 
*  Data are 3-year averages centered on year at column head unless otherwise indicated. 
a  Sample District figures exclude tur; data for 1950-1 and 1951-2 refer to gram and tur only. 
b  Data refer to 9 main oilseeds, except 1950-1 data, which refer to 5 oilseeds (groundnut, castor, sesamum, 
rapeseed and mustard, linseed), and Sample District data, which refer to groundnut, rapeseed and mustard, 
and sesamum only. 




Table 3 (cont’d)--Crop mix and yield
*:  India, sample States, and sample Districts 
1980-1/1987-8   
 
         1980-1               1987-8          Increase 1960/61 to 1980/81 
 Sample  Sample  Sample      Sample  Sample 
  Districts  States India  States  India  Districts States India 
            (for Crop Mix, change in % GCA)   
 
GCA  
 (million hectares)  79.0  94.8  173.1  96.3  176.2  8.5%  9.1%  12.6% 
 
Crop Mix 
  Percent rice  15.4  16.7  23.2  16.6  23.0  0.8  1.7  1.0 
  Percent wheat  8.1  10.3  12.8  10.3  13.3  0.7  2.2  4.2 
  Percent jowar  18.0  15.5  9.5  14.5  8.9  -2.6  -3.0  -2.3 
  Percent bajra  5.7  5.8  6.6  5.2  6.1  -0.8  -0.9  -0.7 
  Percent pulses
a  12.5  13.5  13.2 13.6 12.8  4.3  -0.8  -2.7 
  Percent oilseeds
b  7.8  11.8  10.3 13.9 11.0 -1.5  0  1.7 
 
  1951-2 
 
Yield (kilograms per hectare) 
  Rice  1437.6  1584.2  1239.3  1855.1  1541.6  33.9%  49.2%  28.9% 
  Wheat  1093.7  1728.3  1585.6  2233.1  2053.3  67.3%  127.4%  94.3% 
  Jowar  722.2  724.7  695.0  702.0  682.2  45.6%  69.9%  52.0% 
  Bajra  643.2  637.9  433.8  604.8  485.1  94.9%  90.6%  31.8% 
  Pulses
a  301.8  390.7  446.9 483.1 536.5 -29.1%  -11.9%  -9.8% 
  Oilseeds
b  778.4  652.8  562.8 705.9 689.4  17.3%  28.0%  6.8% 
   
Sources: Indian Agricultural Statistics, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Department of Agriculture 
and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi.  Various issues. 
Area and Production of Principal Crops in India, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Department of 
Agriculture and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi.  Various issues. 
*  Data are 3-year averages centered on year at column head unless otherwise indicated. 
a  Sample District figures exclude tur; data for 1950-1 and 1951-2 refer to gram and tur only. 
b  Data refer to 9 main oilseeds, except 1950-1 data, which refer to 5 oilseeds (groundnut, castor, sesamum, 
rapeseed and mustard, linseed), and Sample District data, which refer to groundnut, rapeseed and mustard, 




and pulses, the changes in crop mix over the study period were fairly uniform at all 
levels. Wheat increased from 8.6% of GCA in 1960/1 to 12.8% in 1980/81 for all-India, 
and from 8.1% to 10.3% in sample States, but grew from 7.4% to only 8.1% in sample 
Districts.  Pulses shrank as a percentage of all-India and sample State GCA, while 
increasing from a relatively small proportion of GCA in sample Districts. 
The second half of Table 3 shows average yield figures for six major crops 
(which benefited from HYV technology to different degrees, and at different times) and 
percentage change in yields over the study period, revealing large yield gains.  Wheat 
topped the list, with a 94% gain in yield for all-India.  Wheat yield gains across sample 
Districts were more modest, at 67%, but, once again sample Districts were not 
representative of sample States, where wheat yields jumped 127%.  Pulse yields declined 
over the same period -- nearly 10% at an all-India level and 12% for sample States, as 
compared with 29% for sample Districts.  Sample Districts did not represent the all-India 
scenario for bajra (millet) yields, either (but were more in line with sample States):  
sample Districts posted a 95% increase in bajra yield, sample States, 91%, and all-India, 
only 32%.  Finally, the timing of yield changes was crop specific, with increases in wheat 
and rice occurring during the 1960s and 1970s, and improvements in jowar (sorghum) 
yields coming somewhat later. 
Table 4 reports trends in labor use:  composition of the rural labor force, gross 
cropped area per farm laborer, and real wages for rural agricultural laborers.  Cultivators 
as a proportion of total farm labor declined over time, with the trend among sample 




Table 4--Labor use data
*:  India, sample states, and sample districts 1960-1/1980-1 
   
 
               1960-1                         1980-1                   1960-1/1980-1        
      Compound growth  (%yr)  
  Sample Sample    Sample Sample    Sample Sample 
  Districts States India  Districts States India  Districts States  India   
 
Cultivator/ 
  Farm Labor
a  0.72 0.72 0.76  0.59  0.58  0.63  -1.00 -1.08 -0.94 
 
 
GCA/Farm  Labor 1.34 1.35 1.20  1.25 1.26  1.21 -0.35  -0.35  0.04 
 (ha/person)
a   
 
 
Ag Workforce/                                                           
  Total Workforce




b                                                             
 (agricultural labor)                                                   
 (1960-1 Rupees/                                                        
   day)  1.34  1.58  -  1.56  1.58  1.56  0.76  0  - 
 
   
Sources: Indian Agricultural Statistics, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Department of Agriculture 
and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi.  Various issues.   
Area and Production of Principal Crops in India, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Department of 
Agriculture and Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi.  Various issues.   
Census of India 1961, 1981, Registrar General of India, New Delhi.   
Agricultural Wages in India, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, New Delhi. 
Various issues.   
India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Labour and Employment.  August 1960-August 1969.  
Indian Labour Journal,  New Delhi. 
*  Data are 3-year averages centered on year at column head unless otherwise indicated. 
a  Population data based on Census year data (1961-1981) only. 
b  Real wages for Sample States and all India are weighted averages of component States’ real wages, with 
weights being the State’s share of the total area’s agricultural labor force.  For Sample States, 1960-1 data 
are based on a 2-year average of 1959-60, and 1960-1.  For Sample Districts, wage is weighted to reflect 
seasonal differences in labor use (by State).  Where Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Agricultural Labor for 
some States was missing (1960-1), adjacent States’ CPI with similar CPI trends and levels were substituted.  
Although population density (per GCA) increased at all levels (as seen in Table 2, above), labor 
intensity  increased only in sample Districts and sample States (where area under plow per farm 
laborer shrank, while rising slightly in India as a whole).  The proportion of the total rural labor 
force involved in agriculture remained more or less constant, and nearly identical for sample 
Districts, sample States, and all-India.  Finally, real wages paid to agricultural laborers in sample 
Districts (adjusted for State-level differences in labor use by season) increased at a rate of 0.76% per 
annum from 1960/61 to 1980/81 (suggesting that rising labor supply was outpaced by demand), 
while remaining stagnant for sample States (where State-level agricultural real wages were not 
seasonally adjusted).
22  No real wage data were available for all-India in 1960/1, but sample District 
wages matched all-India figures at the study’s end (1980/1). 
That sample Districts saw faster real wage growth than, at least, sample States (and perhaps 
all-India) has implications for fertility findings, since this parameter is so strongly suggested by 
theory as affecting fertility change.  This non-representativeness does not compromise our ability to 
statistically estimate the impact of changes in real wage growth on fertility change; however, it may 
decrease the reliability of elasticities based on these estimates. 
Finally, and critically for this study’s objective of assessing the impact of HYV-linked 
technologies on fertility outcomes, Table 5 presents statistics on the adoption 
                                                           
22  We don’t expect the fact that only District-level wages were seasonally adjusted to affect comparability of sample 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of "green revolution" technologies in Indian agriculture.  Dramatic increases in fertilizer 
application rates, mechanical traction, and the use of HYV technologies are all evident.  
Fertilizer application was more intensive at the all-India and sample State than the 
sample District level in each year shown.  Sample Districts lagged behind sample States, 
but outpaced all-India growth levels of fertilizer application rates.  Sample Districts 
started with fewer tractors per hectare in 1960/1 than India as a whole or sample States, 
and their number increased at only 6% per annum, compared to sample State and all-
India rates of 14%.  In both 1970/1 and 1980/1, sample Districts lagged slightly behind 
India as a whole in proportion of farmed area planted to HYV.  The sample Districts’ 
annual growth rate in this proportion outpaced that of both all-India and sample States. In 
both 1970/1 and 1980/1, all-India and sample States both had higher concentrations of 
wheat area in HYV than did sample Districts.  Both sample Districts and sample States 
had higher concentrations of bajra area in HYV than did all-India.  Crop-specific growth 
rates in proportion of crop planted to HYV were more similar for sample Districts and 
all-India, than for sample Districts and sample States.
23  
                                                           
23  Because maize composed such a small percentage of GCA (averaging 2% in sample Districts in 1960/1), 
it was not included in these tables even though it is included in the final analyses.  Of sample Districts, 98% 
used maize HYV at one level of intensity or another during the sample period, on an average of 21% of 
maize area in their initial HYV year. 
To summarize, then, agricultural change characteristics where sample Districts 
differed from sample States and all-India:  a) sample Districts intensified land use more 




sample Districts had a different pattern in HYV crop mixes and yields -- with wheat less 
important and jowar more important in terms of share of GCA than all-India, and with 
smaller wheat yield gains, and larger bajra yield gains than did sample States or all-India; 
c) labor intensity for sample Districts increased on a par with that for sample States, 
while all-India levels decreased; and d) agricultural real wages grew faster in sample 
Districts than in sample States.  Finally, in changes in technology use, sample Districts 
rarely resembled sample States, but often reflected all-India patterns, lagging behind 
sample States in growth in fertilizer application rates, and surpassing sample States in 
growth in proportion of GCA planted to HYV.  The striking exception to this pattern is 
that sample Districts had exceptionally low tractor mechanization rates, vis-ą-vis both 
sample States and all-India. 
These figures confirm substantial change in Indian agriculture as a whole, and in 
the sample area.  And, while the sample area in the aggregate evinced some differences 
from Indian and sample State trends, that same sample area, when examined District by 
District, exhibited wide variation (across sample Districts) in the nature and speed of 
agricultural change.  Thus, the sample touches on situations representing various Indian 
"realities" -- rapid transitions and slow ones -- even if not in precisely the proportions 
observed country-wide.  For our purposes, therefore, the sample  catches the sorts of 
variation -- in levels and trends -- of agriculture-related variables that might, according to 
modern theory, affect demand for and supply of children variables, and, therefore, TFR 




Of equal importance for the analysis, the sample contains wide variation in trends 
for the main demand for and supply of children variables themselves (see Figure 1, Part 
B):  a) income levels; b) key incentives (the costs and benefits of bearing and raising 
children); and c) food availability.  Figures 3 through 5 present frequency distributions 
(at two points in time) demonstrating, again, wide variation in sample District levels of 
proxy variables used to capture demand for and supply of children.  Table 6 confirms a 
variety of trends (positive and negative) in these variables across sample Districts.  Table 
7 provides a variable list. 
Figure 3 depicts the frequency distribution of the value of crop output (VTO) for 
the 1960/61 and 1980/81 endpoints of our sample.  Real, crop-derived income per man-
day rose in spite of increasing population pressure.  Average rural real wage rates (Figure 
4)  rose over the sample period;
24 at the District level, rates of change were, on average, 
positive (Table 6), but some Districts lost ground (annual average changes, in 1960-1 
rupees, ranged from -0.03 to +0.16).  Finally, Figure 5 depicts the frequency distribution 
for (daily) District-level cereal calorie production (CCP) per 
                                                           
24  Growth rates in average rural real wages for agricultural laborers are reported.  Unfortunately, the data 
series cannot be decomposed by age, gender, or other socio-cultural and demographic categories that theory 




Table 6--Descriptive statistics   
 
Variable Units  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum  N 
   
 
  TFRRAT  1971-81  (prop. change in TFR)  -.20  .07  -.38  -.01  131 
 
Agricultural Production Block 
  GCAR
a  1961-81  (GCA growth --’000 has/yr)  2.41  4.12  -8.49  16.51  131 
  GCANCAR
a  1961-81  (GCA/NCA growth -- prp/yr)  .004  .01  -.01  .03  131 
  CERCALR  1961-81  (cereal calories produced/rural cap./yr  .005  .02  -.04  .08  131 
-- comp’d growth rate) 
  CERCAL  1961  (cereal calories produced/rural cap.)  1877.28  738.52  328.70  4268.76  131 
 
Labor Block                                                     
  GCALAB  1961  (GCA/labor -- ha/man-day)  2.34  1.10  .80  7.75  131 
  FRMPRP  1961  (ag labor/total labor growth--prp/yr)  .81  .09  .33  .94  131 
  RLWAGE  1961  (rural real wage 1960-1 Rs)  1.44  .56  .61  4.22  131 
  GCALABR
a  1961  (GCA/labor growth --ha/man-day/yr)  -.03  .03  -.13  .05  131 
  FRMPRPR
a  1961-81  (ag labor/total labor/yr)  .000  .003  -.01  .01  131 
  RLWAGER
a  1961-81  (rural real wage growth 1960-1 Rs/yr)  .02  .03  -.03  .16  131 
 
Agricultural Income Block                                       
  VTOPOP  1961  (value of crop output 1960-1 Rs)  129.25  45.67  40.27  283.06  131 
  VTOPOPR
a  1961-81  (growth in value of crop output  1.01  3.42  -10.39  15.17  131 
1960-1 Rs/rural person/yr) 
 
Green Revolution Block                                          
  TRCNCAR
a 1961-81 (tractors/NCA  has/yr)  .15  .29  -.01  2.25  131 
  NPKGCAR  1961-81  (fertilizer tonnes/GCA/yr  --  .17 .05 .07  .30  131 
comp’d growth rate) 
  GIAGCAR
a 1961-81  (GIA/GCA/yr)  .004  .005  -.01  .02  131 
  PHYVRCER    (HYV rice area/rice area --  .21  .10  -.04  .43  131 
comp’d growth rate) 
  PHYVWHTR    (HYV wheat area/wheat area --  .17  .12  .00  .50  131 
comp’d growth rate) 
  PHYVJOWR    (HYV jowar area/jowar area --  .21  .11  -.07  .39  131 
comp’d growth rate) 
  PHYVBAJR    (HYV bajra area/bajra area --  .11  .12  -.05  .35  131 
comp’d growth rate) 
  PHYVMAZR    (HYV maize area/maize area --  .09  .07  -.12  .30  131 
comp’d growth rate) 
 
Socio-Cultural and Demographic Block 
  PRPTRBE  1971  (sched. tribes/total pop.)  .10  .18  .00  .90  131 
  PRPWIDW  1971  (widows age 40-44/females 40-44)  .15  .04  .06  .26  131 
  PRPCULR
a 1961-81  (cultivators/ag  Workforce/yr) -.002  .003  -.01  .01  131 
  LITFEM1  1971-81  (lit. females age 15-25/females 15-25  .06 .05  -.02  .29  131 
-- change in proportion ’71-’81) 
  LITFEM2  1971-81  (lit. females age 25-35/females 25-35  .13 .07 .02  .33  131 
-- change in proportion ’71-’81) 
  MARFEM1  1971-81  (married fem.s age 15-19/fem.s. 15-19  -.13  .07  -.30  .18  131 
-- change in proportion ’71-’81) 
  MARFEM2  1971-81  (married fem.s age 20-24/fem.s. 20-24  -.03  .04  -.19  .06  131 
-- change in proportion ’71-’81) 
  MARFEM3  1971-81  (married fem.s age 25-29/fem.s. 25-29  -.003  .02  -.06  .06  131 
-- change in proportion ’71-’81)   
 
a Estimated growth rate for sample period (a quadratic function form of time tested by District for each variable); where both the linear and 




Table 7 -- Variable list   
 
Variable Description 
   
 
CERCALR
b  Compound rate of growth (based on endpoints consisting of three-year averages 
centered around the sample endyears) in cereal calories per rural population produced 
annually in District. 
 
FRMPRP  Proportion of total District laborers involved in agricultural labor at the beginning of the 
sample period (taken from the 1961 Indian Census). 
 
FRMPRPR
a  Estimated growth rate (proportion/yr) in proportion of total District laborers involved in 
agricultural labor (as a quadratic function of time t), evaluated at t=1975. 
 
GCALAB  Land-to-labor ratio (has. gross cropped area/man-day) at the beginning of the sample 
period (a three-year average centered on the year 1961). 
 
GCALABR
a  Estimated growth rate (ha./man-day/yr) for gross cropped area to labor (as a quadratic 
function of time t), evaluated at t=1975. 
 
GCANCAR
a  Estimated growth rate (proportion/yr) for gross cropped area to net cropped area (as a 
quadratic function of time t), evaluated at t=1975. 
 
GCAR
a  Estimated growth rate (has/yr) for gross cropped area (as a quadratic function of time t), 
evaluated at t=1975. 
 
GIAGCAR
a  Estimated growth rate (proportion/yr) for gross irrigated area to gross cropped area (as a 
quadratic function of time t), evaluated at t=1975. 
 
LITFEM1  Change (from 1971 to 1981) in proportion of rural females age 15-25 who are literate. 
 
LITFEM2  Change (from 1971 to 1981) in proportion of rural females age 25-35 who are literate. 
 
MARFEM1  Change (from 1971 to 1981) in proportion of rural females age 15-19 who are married. 
 
MARFEM2  Change (from 1971 to 1981) in proportion of rural females age 20-24 who are married. 
 
MARFEM3  Change (from 1971 to 1981) in proportion of rural females age 25-29 who are married. 
 
NPKGCAR
b  Estimated compound rate of growth of tonnes of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium 
fertilizer applied per hectare annually in District. 
 
       BAJ 
      JOW 
PHYV{MAZ}R
b  Compound rate of growth (based on endpoints consisting of 
     RCE  three-year averages centered around the sample endyears 
    WHT  of proportion of crop specified planted to HYV annually in District. 




Table 7 -- Variable list (continued)   
 
Variable Description 
   
PRPCULR
a  Estimated growth rate (proportion/yr) in proportion of rural District population 
composed of cultivators (as a quadratic function of time t), evaluated at t=1975 (trend 
based on annual population figures extrapolated (assuming compound growth) from 
1961, 1971, and 1981 Indian Censuses. 
 
PRPTRBE  Proportion of rural District population composed of  scheduled tribes, based on 1971 
Indian Census. 
 
PRPWIDW  Proportion of rural District females age 40-44 who were widows, based on 1971 Indian 
Census. 
 
RLWAGE  Rural real wage (expressed in 1960-1 Rs) at the beginning of the sample period (a three-
year average centered on the year 1961). 
 
RLWAGER
a  Estimated growth rate (1960-1 Rs/yr) in real wage (District-level wages were deflated 
using State-level CPI for agricultural laborers) (as a quadratic function of time t), 
evaluated at t=1975. 
 
TFRRAT  Proportional change, from 1971 to 1981, in District-level Total Fertility Rate estimates 
(a negative number connotes a drop in TFR). 
 
TRCNCAR
a  Estimated growth rate (tractors/ha/yr) for tractors per net cropped area (as a quadratic 
function of time t), evaluated at t=1975. 
 
VTOPOP  Value of total output (VTO) (expressed in 1960-1 Rs) per capita (rural) for available 
(top fifteen in terms of area) crops at the beginning of the sample period (a three-year 
average centered on the year 1961). 
 
VTOPOPR
a  Estimated growth rate (1960-1 Rs/yr) in crop VTO per rural capita (District-level VTO 
is based on District-level output and farm harvest prices deflated using State-level CPI 
for agricultural laborers) (as a quadratic function of time t), evaluated at t=1975. 
   
a Growth rates were estimated through regressions of annual data (in the case of population numbers taken 
from the Census, annual population in inter-censal years was interpolated assuming a compound rate of 
growth), using time, time
2, and a constant as right-hand side variables.  For those Districts for which both 
independent variables had estimated coefficients significantly different from zero, the first derivative of the 
estimated equation (the growth rate) was evaluated at time t=1975, at the middle of the decade for which 
demographic transition is being examined. 
 
b In the case of NPKGCAR, an exponential function fit the annual data the best, for most Districts; in the 
case of PHYV___R, and CERCALR, compound growth rate was determined for each District using three-
year averages surrounding the sample endpoints (for the HYV variables, the initial endpoint consists of the 





25  This calorie-weighted measure reflects our belief that cereal prices 
alone may not capture relative calorie availability.  While CCP is not a complete measure 
of food availability, especially given inter-District trade, we expect that, particularly for 
the earlier years under study (early 1960s), and for this relatively poor set of Districts, 
CCP provides an acceptable, if less than perfect, indication of relative food availability.   
The rate of growth in CCP is more problematic as a measure of chance in food 
availability, given the growing trade "wedge" separating locally produced and consumed 
food (due to infrastructural improvements, and probably not unrelated to the HYV-driven 
yield and income gains) over the study.
26  Impressive average growth is evident in caloric 
production, once again despite rapid population growth.  
                                                           
25  District-level growth rates in production of daily cereal calorie equivalents per capita were computed as 
compound growth rates, with the endpoints being (t denoting 1960/1 and 1980/1, and i noting main cereal 
crops wheat, rice, bajra, jowar, and maize; all variables computed at District level): 
(Σ AVCRPOUTi,t*CALORIEi)/RURPOPt/DAYS; where 
 
AVCRPOUT = average annual crop output for crop i in three years centered on year t; 
CALORIE = edible calories per harvestable unit of crop i (Gopalan, et al., 1981); 
RURPOP =  rural population from Census in year t; and  
DAYS = number of days for which crop output required, i.e., 365. 
 
26Note that CCP, constructed using cereal production only, and used to capture trends and variation in food 
availability, differs from the price-weighted value of total crop output (VTO), constructed using a wider 




4.  FACTORS AFFECTING DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF CHILDREN 
EVIDENCE OF LINKS TO CHANGES IN HUMAN FERTILITY 
HYV-linked agricultural change is hypothesized to affect human fertility change 
through modifications to the factors affecting the demand for and supply of children,
27 
namely, changes in real wages, income, and food availability.  While, as noted above, a 
priori, theory leads to an expectation of initially rising, then falling TFR in response to 
such change, it does not:  a) explicitly incorporate the timing of agricultural change vis-ą-
vis hypothesized TFR change; b) explicitly examine the paths through, extents to, and 
directions in which each HYV-linked technology (and other agricultural variables) can be 
hypothesized to affect demand for and supply of children -- nor, therefore, the net effects 
of such technologies taken singly or together; or c) (aside from consideration of 
extremely poor areas, where malnutrition constrains fertility) consider the extent to which 
the net effects described in b) may be conditional on key "starting" or "baseline" 
agricultural or socio-cultural and demographic conditions.  The implications for theory of 
results from this section will be referred to in the Discussion section. 
To identify the impact of levels and changes in real wage, income, and food 
availability on fertility change at District level, measures of these were regressed on TFR 
change.  Socio-cultural and demographic factors were controlled for.  
                                                           




Table 8, Equation 1, presents the results for this OLS equation, regressing 
TFRRAT (proportional change in District-level TFR from 1971-81) on intervening 
variables
28 that seem plausible determinants of:   a) demand for children -- 1961 rural real 
wage rates,  estimated
29 (annual) rural real wage growth rates over the study period 
(1961-81), an income measure (value of crop output per rural capita) for 1961, and 
estimated rate of change for this income measure over the period  (1961-81);
30 b) supply 
of children -- annual production of cereal calories per rural population in 1961, and rate 
of change in this cereal production measure over the study period; and c) an array of 
socio-cultural  (see Easterlin and Crimmins, 1985) -- including the proportion of 
population belonging to scheduled tribes in 1971, change in age-specific female literacy 
and marriage rates during the fertility decline (1971-1981), and growth rate of cultivators 
                                                           
28  All independent variables are at District level. 
29  For all estimated growth rates, District-level predictions were estimated as a quadratic function of time, 
except in those cases where a linear equation fits the annual data better (i.e., results in a higher adjusted R
2). 
30Unfortunately, more comprehensive measures of rural income, e.g., including off-farm and livestock 
sources, were not available at District level.  Nor were data on District-level cost of crop production 
available.  Finally, this income measure, based on value of crop output, does not capture extent of 




as a proportion of the rural workforce over the entire study period
31 and demographic 
(widowhood prevalence among women aged 40-44 in 1971) factors. 
                                                           
31  Measuring demand and supply starting in 1961, and monitoring fertility only from 1971 assumes these 




Table 8--Regression analysis   
Equation 1 - TFRRAT 
(prop. change in TFR 1971-81) 
Labor Supply, HYV-Related 
Institutional Factors  
 Estimated  t-ratio  _ 
Variable Unit  Coefficient  (absolute  value)  Elasticity
c R
2   
 
Demand for Children Variables     0.04 
  RLWAGER 1961-81
a  (rural real wage growth 
 1960-1 Rs/yr)  -0.43**   2.14  0.04   
  VTOPOPR 1961-81
a  (growth in value of crop output 
1960-1 Rs/rural person/yr)  2.93ε-4 0.18 
  RLWAGE  1961  (rural real wage 1960-1 Rs)  0.01  1.13 
  VTOPOP  1961  (value of crop output 1960-1 Rs)  -4.73ε-4*** 3.55  0.31 
 
Supply of Children Variables       0.06 
  CERCALR 1961-1981  (cereal calories produced 
/rural cap./yr--comp’d growth rate)  0.11  0.35 
  CERCAL  1961  (cereal calories produced 
/rural cap.)  1.80ε-5** 2.10  -0.17 
 
Socio-Cultural Factor and Demographic Variables       0.39 
  PRPTRBE 1971  (sched. tribes/total pop.)  -0.11***  3.01  0.06 
  PRPWIDW 1971  (widows age 40-44/females 40-44)  0.42***  2.87  -0.31 
  PRPCULR 1961-81
a (cultivators/ag  workforce/yr) 4.45***  2.69  0.04 
  LITFEM1 1971-81  (lit. females age 15-25/females 15-25 
--change in proportion ’71-’81)  0.28**  2.03  -0.08 
  LITFEM2 1971-81  (lit. females age 25-35/females 25-35 
--change in proportion ’71-’81)  -0.36***  3.66  0.23 
  MARFEM1 1971-81  (married fem.s age 15-19/fem.s 15-19 
--change in proportion ’71-’81)  0.15**  2.04  0.10 
  MARFEM2 1971-81  (married fem.s age 20-24/fem.s 20-24 
--change in proportion ’71-’81)  0.32*  1.86  0.05 
  MARFEM3 1971-81  (married fem.s age 25-29/fem.s 25-29 
--change in proportion ’71-’81)  -0.45  1.15 
 
Labor Supply Variables 
  GCALABR 1961-81
a (GCA/labor  growth--ha/man-day/yr)  --  -- 
  FRMPRPR 1961-81
a  (ag labor/total labor growth--prp/yr)  --  -- 
  GCALAB  1961  (GCA/labor--ha/man-day)  --  -- 
  FRMPRP  1961  (ag labor/total labor)  --  -- 
 




   0.49   
 
N   131     
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
a Estimated growth rate for sample period (a quadratic functional form of time tested by District for each 
variable); where both the linear and quadratic terms were significant (most Districts), the function was 
evaluated at 1975. 
b The coefficient is estimated (and elasticity given) not for RLWAGER, but for the predicted value of 
RLWAGER resulting from an equation including HYV-related variables, mechanization, and combinations 
of these variables.  In other words, the component of real wage growth explained by HYV-linked 
technological change and mechanization. 
c Evaluated at dependent and independent variable means. 
d R
2 column lists the contribution of each "block" of variables to the equation’s overall R
2 (that is, the 
equation’s R
2 is the sum of  R




The results point up significant demand, supply, and socio-cultural and 
demographic variables’ effects on fertility change at District level for the study period 
(with nearly half of the inter-District  variation explained).
32  Of the "demand-for-
children" variables, higher levels of value of crop output per capita in 1961 (before the 
HYV-linked changes studied here began) and faster growth in agricultural real wage rates 
over the period (regardless of initial real wage rate) were both associated with larger 
proportional fertility declines in the decade 1971-81.  A 1% increase in value of crop 
output led to a 0.31% greater proportional TFR decline; a 1% increase in real wage 
growth, however, translated into only 0.04% greater proportional TFR decline.  This 
"block" of variables accounted for 4% of the variation in proportional TFR decline. 
                                                           
32  These results regarding TFR change do not bear on these measures as determinants of TFR levels.  
Regarding the equation’s form, note that non-linearities of the demand-for- and supply-of-children variables 
were tested and found not significant, and that their rates of growth were tested and found not to be 
endogenous using the Hausman-Wu test.  Results of these tests are available from the authors. 
Of the "child supply" variables, higher 1961 levels of cereal calories produced per 
rural head were associated with lower proportional TFR declines in the 1971-81 decade, 
with an elasticity of -0.17 (that is, a 1% increase in calorie per capita production meant 
0.17% less of a proportional TFR decline).  Recalling the discussion of a "biological 
fertility curve" (in the Introduction), and keeping in mind the caveats associated with 
using cereal calorie production as a measure of food availability), this suggests that 
around 1961 a preponderance of sample Districts lay clustered between the critical 




increasing returns to reproductive capacity -- the fertility-enhancing effect seen here.  
While rate of change in District-level cereal production over the study period registered 
no effect on TFR declines, the serious shortcomings associated with this variable as a 
cross-sectional measurement of changes in food availability makes this finding far less 
conclusive.  This "block" of variables accounted for slightly more, 6%, of the variation in 
proportional TFR decline. 
Socio-cultural and demographic factors were also significant (though one of them 
only 10%), explaining 39% of the variation in proportional TFR decline.  First, Districts 
with relatively 1971 values of some variables normally associated with low fertility, 
tended to show significantly above-average declines in total fertility rates in 1971-81; 
such variables included higher proportion of tribal population, and lower proportion of 
widows among women aged 40-44 (suggesting that more women were still potentially 
child-bearing close to the end of their reproductive cycle).  Their elasticities were 
respective responses of 0.06% and -0.31% in TFR proportional decline to a 1% increase 
in the independent variable. 
Second, a District in which the proportion of cultivator households fell 1% faster 
than the average for all Districts in our sample during 1961-81 -- signalling a relative 
increase in landlessness and/or in non-farm involvement -- would typically have a 0.04% 
above-average decline in the total fertility rate (in proportional terms). 
Third, as for literacy, the direction of fertility effects varied surprisingly by age 
group.   A District with above-average literacy improvement among women aged 15-25 




Districts; among women aged 25-35, it had the opposite effect (fertility dampening).  
However, the latter, more familiar impact of female literacy in decreasing fertility (for 
example, by increasing opportunity cost of women’s time), was much stronger (that is, an 
elasticity of 0.23, as opposed to -0.08 for the younger age group). 
Fourth, in line with expectations, Districts with above-average rates of decline in 
marriage among women aged 15-19 and 20-24, during 1971-81, experienced faster-than-
average proportional TFR declines over the same period.  However, the elasticity for the 
older cohort was larger:  a 1% decline among the younger cohort was associated with a 
0.10% further proportional decline in TFR, whereas a 1% decline in marriage rates 
among the older cohort, with only a 0.5% further proportional decline in TFR. 
Of the significant child demand and supply variables, only one -- 1961-1981 real 
wage growth rates -- could be affected by HYV-linked agricultural change that started in 
the mid-1960s, since the income and cereal production level variables were measured in 
1961, prior to the beginning of the HYV-related changes examined here.  We saw above 
that faster real wage growth was linked to faster TFR declines.  How did HYV-linked 
agricultural change affect real wage growth -- to what extent was the former responsible 




5.  HYV-ASSOCIATED AGRICULTURAL CHANGE: LINKS TO REAL WAGE 
GROWTH AND CHANGES IN HUMAN FERTILITY 
 
Thus far, our results point to one factor influencing the change in demand for 
children -- real wage growth over a two-decade period -- as one significant determinant 
of changes in human fertility at District level.  To what degree was HYV-related 
agricultural change responsible for the real wage changes that influenced fertility?
  Equation 2, Table 9 shows the results of an OLS regression examining the links 
between District-level real wage growth rates and HYV-related agricultural change, 
controlling for labor supply variables.
33  Also included as an independent variable is 
growth in tractor mechanization (number of tractors per net cropped area (NCA) of  
land), which, while not strictly part of the HYV technology "package," often 
accompanied its adoption. 
The adjusted R
2 of the equation was 0.32, with the HYV-related technology 
variables accounting for 20% of total inter-District variation in real wage growth rates 
(the block added significantly to the explanatory power of the equation, with an F-
statistic of 7.35), the labor supply "block" accounting for 7%, and tractorization 
                                                           
33  Labor supply variables are combinations of demographic and agricultural variables that can influence 
growth rates in real wages, above and beyond the impact of HYV-linked technical change.  They are 
controlled for here to isolate estimated coefficients on HYV-linked technologies’ influence on real wage 




explaining an additional 4%.  These results illustrate the imperfect labor mobility among 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Within the HYV-related block, three variables had significant associations with 
real wage growth.  First, increases in gross irrigated area as a proportion of GCA was 
positively tied to real wage growth, with a 1% increase in this proportion resulting in a 
.32% higher real wage growth rate.  Second, surprisingly, growth in fertilizer use per 
gross cropped hectare dampened real wage growth, all else held constant.  Moreover, the 
elasticity was high -- a 1% increase in fertilizer application growth rate resulting in a 
1.04% decrease in real wage growth rate.  Third, only one crop-specific variable revealed 
a significant link to real wage change:  a 1% rise in growth of HYV wheat prevalence 
leading to a 0.75% decline in real wage growth rate, possibly because HYV wheat was 
associated with other forms of mechanization, some of it labor displacing -- for example, 
threshers and reaper-binders -- not captured in the tractorization variable.
34 
                                                           
34  Two other variables were significantly associated with real wage growth throughout the study period, 
and in the expected directions:  a 1% above-average increase in a labor supply variable, viz., the land/labor 
(GCA per man-day) ratio in 1961,  would be associated with a 1.26% above-average increase in the annual 
real wage growth rate; a 1% increase in tractorization rates, on the other hand, would be associated with a  
0.2% below-average real wage growth rate. 
We have demonstrated the link between real wage growth and fertility, and 
subsequently measured the impact of HYV-linked technologies, plus mechanization, on 
real wage growth.  Several questions remain.  First, how much do HYV-linked 
technologies drive real wage growth’s effect on fertility change?  A second question 
involves interpretation of our results.  Given that imperfect markets and data mean our 




technical change or mechanization on fertility change, is there evidence that these 
phenomena influence fertility decisions apart from the real wage growth path measured 
here?  Our average annual wage data would not capture, for example, a fertility effect of 
altered seasonal labor demand patterns brought on by the introduction of HYV-linked 
technology.  Two additional equations are estimated to further clarify the influence of 
HYV-linked technologies on fertility change via real wage growth (to the extent that this 
is captured in the variables of this study), and apart from such growth. 
The first equation, not reported here,
35 estimates the component of real wage 
growth explained by HYV-linked technological change and tractor mechanization using 
OLS (that is, real wage growth was the dependent variable, and HYV-linked 
technological change and tractor mechanization variables, separately and interactively, 
were the independent variables):  HYV-linked technology plus mechanization accounted 
for 27% of the variation observed in real wage growth (adjusted R
2=0.27). 
                                                           




In order to test whether real wage growth due to HYV-linked technology and 
mechanization influenced fertility change, the next step was to include predicted real 
wage growth from the above equation as an independent variable in place of real wage 
growth in an OLS equation with TFR proportional change as the dependent variable, 
regressed on a more fully specified array of variables than was the case in Equation 1.  
As in Equation 1, an independent variable with a negative coefficient can be interpreted 
as hastening the proportional fertility decline.  In addition to the Equation 1 variables, 
viz., those affecting (a) demand for children (including the predicted growth rate of real 
wages, as noted above), (b) the biological supply of children, and (c) the socio-cultural 
and demographic variables, we also include (d) labor-supply control variables, (e) 
variables relating to HYV-linked technology, (f) a tractorization indicator, and (g) other 
variables indicating the pace of agricultural change.  HYV-linked technology and 
tractorization variables were included to test for the significance of non-real-wage-
growth fertility effects of this agricultural transition (since their real wage growth effects 
are controlled for).
36   
                                                           
36  As was the case for Equation 1, Hausman-Wu endogeneity tests were performed and rejected for 
predicted real wage growth, crop-derived income growth, and cereal calorie production growth vis-ą-vis the 
TFR change dependent variable; in addition, endogeneity of land/labor growth and agricultural labor/total 




Results appear in Table 9, Equation 3.
37 
The estimated coefficient for the predicted real wage growth variable is negative, 
statistically significant at 5%, and has an elasticity of 0.20, suggesting that above-average 
growth in real wages at District level caused by HYV technologies and tractorization 
spurred on above-average proportional declines in TFR.  Moreover, evidence suggests 
that HYV- and mechanization-linked real wage changes not only affected TFR change, 
but were the driving force behind the impact of real wage growth on fertility decline:  in 
an equation specified similarly to Equation 3, but including the residual rather than the 
predicted values for real wage growth, the residual -- the component of real wage growth 
not explained by HYV technological change and mechanization -- had no significant 
influence on fertility change.
38 
                                                           
37  If any of these HYV and/or mechanization variables ha been chiefly responsible for real wage growth’s 
effect on fertility change:  a) their coefficients would have been expected to turn up as significantly linked 
to fertility change once their effect on real wage growth was purged; and b) the coefficient on the real wage 
growth variable, and/or its significance level, would have been likely to change from one version of 
Equation 3 to the other.   
38  "Not explained," that is, in a statistical sense; we do not mean to imply that household decisionmakers 




However, the fertility effects of real wage growth induced by HYV technology do 
not wholly capture HYV impacts on fertility change.  Controlling for these effects, the 
HYV-related agricultural change variables and mechanization, tested as a block, are still 
linked to human fertility change (though only at the 9% significance level, with F-
statistic=1.82).  This suggests that Districts experiencing faster-than-average change in 
technologies linked to HYVs, also enjoyed faster-than-average declines in total fertility 
rates for reasons other than the already-established effect via our measure of real wage 
growth.  These variables, as a block (and purged of real wage effects), are associated with 
3% of subsequent inter-District variation in proportional fertility decline. 
More specifically, Districts with above-average rates of growth in proportion of 
wheat and rice gross cropped area planted to HYV, starting in the mid-1960s and 
continuing until 1981, tended to experience significantly (at 10%) above-average 
proportionate declines in TFR from 1971-81 at the 10% level, with similar elasticities 
(0.15 and 0.13, respectively).  Growth rate in proportion of bajra (millet) gross cropped 
area planted to HYV had the opposite effect (also significant at the 10% level), but with a 
smaller elasticity:  with a 1% increase in proportion of a District’s bajra cropping area 
planted with HYV seeds, 0.07% less of a TFR proportional decline would be 
experienced.  Our HYV wheat and rice variables may be capturing the presence of 
accompanying labor-displacing innovations other than the tractorization that we control 
for, for example, threshers, reapers, and weedicides, that are not fully reflected in the 
predicted real wage growth variable.  Wheat and rice HYV diffusion would therefore be 




fertility transition.  Bajra HYV diffusion, on the other hand, might also have labor 
demand effects unexplained by our prediction of measured real wage growth, perhaps to 
due its frequent association with less unequal operated holdings, and thus with owner- or 
tenant-farming (that is, less hired labor).  Then, an above-average rate of increase in the 
prevalence of high-yielding varieties in the bajra crop -- as compared with a similar 
increase in rice or wheat -- could well be associated with rising family labor demand, 
which, especially as it encompasses child and adolescent labor, would be expected to 




Of the child demand, child supply, and socio-cultural and demographic factors 
tested as statistically significant determinants of fertility change in Equation 1, all but 
two (changes in the literacy rates for women aged 15-25, and changes in the marriage 
rates for women aged 15-19) remained significant after controlling for HYV-related 
technology, labor supply, mechanization rate, and expansion of gross cropped area and 
GCA/NCA ratio.
39   With the exception of the new real wage growth variable, elasticities 
for statistically significant relationships remained relatively unchanged from those 
described in Equation 1.  With the changes from Equation 1 to 3, relative contribution of 
blocks to overall explanatory power shifted somewhat:  with the predicted real wage 
growth, the child demand block in Equation 3 explains only 1% of total variation in 
TFRRAT; the child supply block explains 10%; and the socio-cultural and demographic 
block accounts for 32%. 
The labor supply variables included in Equation 3 (but not in Equation 1) 
explained 2% of total variation in the dependent variable, with a 1961 labor force 
composition variable the only one significant (at the 10% level).  A district with a 1% 
above-average proportion of agricultural laborers in the rural workforce in 1961 tended to 
                                                           
39  As noted above, predicted values of real wage growth were used in Equation 3, differentiating the child 
demand variables from those used in Equation 1.  The predicted real wage growth effect held up in 
Equation 3 as negative and significantly tied to TFR change at the 5% level; when tested in place of 
predicted real wage growth (but not reported here), actual real wage growth was also significantly, 








6.  DISCUSSION 
 
High-yielding varieties of staple crops were developed to stave off mass 
starvation in Asia, and to provide "breathing space" during which demographic 
transitions would occur in developing countries.  This research assesses the impact of 
HYV-linked technologies on one essential component of demographic transition -- 
human fertility.  Economic theory and recent demographic evidence highlight likely 
avenues through which HYV-linked technical change in agriculture might affect 
household fertility decisions:  changes in real wages, improved incomes, improved access 
to food, and changes in traditional institutions and norms. 
Data from 131 Indian Districts demonstrate dramatic and highly variable (inter-
District) agricultural change from 1961-1981, as well as across-the-board -- but again 
                                                           
40  The coefficient on the estimated rate of change of agricultural labor/total labor, not significant in the 
reported version of Equation 3, was significant at the 10% level and positive when real wage growth was 




variable -- decreases in fertility over the 1971-1981 period.
41  We initially focused on the 
relationship of 1961 levels and subsequent growth rates in real wages, income, and food 
availability to subsequent fertility declines.
42 
                                                           
41  Lack of data (i.e, lack of panel data for both demographic and agricultural data series) prevented our 
testing alternative time-lag structures for the effects of agriculture-related change on fertility declines.   
42  Given that, as stated previously, theory does not allow us to hypothesize a priori about the size and 
direction of fertility change determinants, discussion of results in this section focuses on proposing 
plausible scenarios given the theory, not definitive ones. 
A strong negative association between real wage growth and changes in total 
fertility rates (TFRs) was identified, that is, Districts with above-average growth in real 
wages in rural areas experienced above-average proportional declines in TFRs.  
According to theory, growth in rural real wages could have this effect through dampened 
child demand if it captured:  a)  increased opportunity cost of child-rearing; b) rising 
demand for more highly skilled labor (which could prompt the decision to invest in 
educating a few children (rather than rearing many); or c) increased old-age security for 
parents with fewer children (given higher expected real income). 
Initial (that is, 1961) differences among Districts in the rural real-wage rate had 
no bearing on their speed of TFR decline over the 1971-81 period.  Growth in income 
derived from annual cropping (per capita) had no influence on TFR change either, but 
starting levels of crop-derived income per person did:  Districts with higher 1961 levels 




if such Districts were "primed" to replace investments in child quality for those in child 
quantity. 
Finally, above-average 1961 levels of cereal calorie production per rural capita 
led to slower proportional decreases in TFR, because (we believe):  a) cereal calorie 
production in 1961 provided a relative measure of District-level food availability; and b) 
sample Districts clustered around levels of caloric intake below biomedical "sufficiency" 
levels at levels such that more calories yielded increasing returns to fertility.  If, in these 
instances, greater food availability removed biological constraints to fertility, subsequent 
fertility declines may have been dampened.  Growth rates of cereal availability did not 
affect TFR change. 
In Equations 1-3, we demonstrated the impact of real wage growth on TFR 
change.  Next, the impact of HYV-linked technologies on such growth was assessed, 
controlling for labor supply effects (previous analyses having failed to link growth in 
either income or cereal availability to declining TFR).  Overall, in wheat and rice, 
Districts with above-average growth in the proportion of area planted to HYV tended to 
have below-average growth in real wages, as did those Districts with faster tractor 
mechanization (in some Districts, real wages actually declined).  Fertilizer use had the 
same retarding effect on real wage growth, a surprising finding.  HYV-linked technical 
change in irrigation led to increased growth in real wages. 
Given data (and labor-market) imperfections, and consequent (expected) impacts 
on the ability of price-related variables (especially the rural real wage) to fully capture 




performed to assess the impact of these technologies on TFR change:  a) via their effect 
on real wage growth; and b) net of their effect on real wage growth.  Results show that:  
a) HYV-linked technological change and tractorization did affect rural real wage growth, 
and were responsible for some of its fertility-dampening effect; and b) controlling for the 
effect on TFR change of HYV-linked technical changes via our measure of real wage 
growth, HYV-linked technical changes still influenced TFR change, and did so, 
depending on the crop in question, in different directions, due to differences in the labor-
displacing or labor-using nature of the production process, given real wages.   Higher 
proportions of HYV in wheat and rice led to steeper proportional fertility declines, while 
those in bajra led to smaller proportional fertility declines. 
The study confirms that socio-cultural and demographic factors, some amenable 
to policy, affect fertility change at District level.  Districts with faster decreasing 
proportions of cultivator households in the population experienced faster fertility 
declines, perhaps due to the removal of the fertility incentive provided by child and 
adolescent family labor on farm.  Having a workforce that is more diversified out of 
agriculture before technological change begins enhances fertility decline (perhaps 
capturing differences in norms, information, and services that can characterize a 
diversified versus a largely agricultural workforce); and larger increases in prevalence of 
female literacy for females aged 25-35 also translate into larger fertility declines (with 




rearing).  This array of socio-cultural and demographic factors exerted a much stronger 
influence on fertility than did technological change.
43 
                                                           
 
43  This study did not delve into the extent to which technological change works via socio-cultural and 
demographic determinants to affect TFR declines (or how the primary "three general fertility determinants" 
explicitly interact with these variables vis-ą-vis fertility), but correlations among these variables suggest 
that such an indirect link is possible. 
The fact that some technology packages, as in the case of HYV bajra, wheat, and 
rice, do have fertility effects should not prompt policymakers to discard otherwise 
promising technologies on the grounds of those effects -- whether they retard or enhance 
fertility.  Governments and the international community must continue to seek 
biotechnological and other answers to particular agroecological problems of 
underdeveloped areas, to improve crop robustness in the face of biotic and moisture 
stresses, to raise yield potential in main food staples, and to promote adoption of 
appropriate technologies through regional outreach.  However, it is critical that 
policymakers know what the human fertility impact of the technological packages is, so 
that whenever theory and/or empirical evidence suggest that such technology packages 
will affect, directly or indirectly, the population side of the food-per-head equation, 
policy can seek to compensate for such effects.  Likewise, evidence of technology-
induced fertility decline should not lead governments to reduce investments in other key 
areas.  This study (and many others) point to policy-relevant community factors such as 
non-agricultural social infrastructure, particularly female education, as effective ways to 




This study suffers from three principal drawbacks.  First, India’s fertility and 
agricultural transitions are far from over, and this paper captures just a part (an important 
part, albeit) of each.  More time, more longitudinally comprehensive data series 
(especially the 1991 census results in full), and more comprehensive information (for 
example, incomes, wages disaggregated by labor type, and nutritional status vis-ą-vis 
biological fertility thresholds) would be required to more thoroughly pinpoint pathways 
through which technological change affects fertility, and explore how quickly such 
effects take place (for example, the time lag structure left unspecified in theoretical 
diagrams such as Figure 1). 
Second, there are important gaps in our data.  Regionally, they preclude the 
inclusion of some of the poorest areas of India, which have experienced the least "green 
revolution" and often the lowest TFR declines.  These data gaps can and should be 
rectified.  Primary data often exist, but much time and many resources will need to be 
invested to collect, prepare, and analyze these data.  It is especially unfortunate that 
disaggregated District-level results, especially TFRs from the Sample Registration 
Survey, are not available; they would give a much more reliable and time-specific 
(yearly) picture of fertility changes -- and permit much better tracking of local time-lags 
from, and effects of, HYV progress -- than was possible with our purely Census-based 
population data. 
Finally, much of the impact of technical change in agriculture is likely to be felt 
below the District level.  We should recall that many Indian Districts have larger 




Different socioeconomic and ethnic groups -- especially the least mobile -- are probably 
affected by localized changes in area under plow, in crop-specific yield increases, and in 
crop mix.  Within a District, different implications for household fertility decisions may 
co-exist given the same District-level trends in food production and agricultural change.  
Data of sufficient geographic and longitudinal scope for undertaking the current study at 
a more disaggregated level are not currently available; major investments would be 
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